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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
----00000----
ROBERT W. ADKINS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 19170 
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
----00000----
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
----00000----
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant initiated this action seeking a 
declaratory judgment that an oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease 
erroneously entered into with the Division of State Lands 
and Forestry is valid and binding, despite the fact the land 
involved in the lease has at all relevant times to this 
matter been withdrawn from oil, gas and hydrocarbon explora-
tion and development by order of the State Land Board. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOl'iER _c_QUR'J.' 
After hearing cross motions for summary judgment, 
the court issued a Memorandum Decision in which the 
court held that Plaintiff-Appellant had failed to comply 
with the jurisdictional requirements for judicial review 
in this case, §65-1-9(2) and §63-30-1 ~ ~., U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended. Appellant's motion for summary judg-
ment was denied, Respondent's motion for summary judgment 
was granted, and the action was dismissed with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of the 
trial court in all respects. 
INTRODUCTION 
The trial court dismissed Appellant's lawsuit on 
jurisdictional grounds as will be discussed in detail, 
ini.r..g_, and, therefore, did not reach the merits of his 
claims. By way of brief introduction in order to place this 
appeal in perspective, it is important to note that this 
lawsuit has come about because an oil, gas and hydrocarbon 
lease was issued to the Appellant by the Respondent, 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, when it should never 
have been issued at all. The land which was leased had been 
previously withdrawn from oil and gas leasing by the State 
-2-
Land Board and was, therefore, unavailable to be leased to 
anyone. The mistake in issuing this lease occurred because 
even though the land had been withdrawn from oil and gas 
leasing, the withdrawals were not indicated properly on the 
plat maps which identify state-owned lands and which are 
located in the offices of the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry. The Division is charged with the day-to-day 
management of approximately 3.6 million acres of land, 
most of which lie in scattered, isolated sections of land 
throughout the State. (R. 78-81) Although it is not known 
for sure why the withdrawals of these lands were not 
indicated properly on the Division's plat maps, it is 
believed the oversight occurred when the Division changed 
its state-wide plat mapping system in 1980. (R. 78-80) Thus, 
even apart from the jurisdictional issues in this matter, if 
it were to be decided a mineral lease .l!l..l.l§.i_ be issued 
contrary to the State Land Board's determination that this 
land should be withdrawn from oil and gas leasing, such a 
decision would have devastating implications on the day-to-
day administration of state-owned lands because it would, in 
effect, require the Division to act according to a standard 
of perfection in carrying out its land management responsi-
bilities. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March 1980 Appellant, Mr. Robert w. Adkins, applied 
for an oil, gas and hydrocarbon lease trom Respondent, Utah 
Division of State Lands and Forestry, (hereinafter the "Di-
vision"), for property in San Juan County, Utah, described 
as follows: 
Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6, and the South half of the 
Northwest quarter and the South half in Section 2, of 
Township 27 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, containing 509.18 acres. 
Also, the North half of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 8, Township 27 South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, containing 80 acres. 
Appellant made application to lease this land under 
the so-called "first applicant" procedure set forth in §65-
1-45 U.C.A. (1953), as amended; the property in question 
had nQt. been posted by the Division as available for 
leasing pursuant to the competitive bidding procedures 
provided in subsection (2) of §65-1-45. * 
On March 24, 1980, Appellant and the Division entered 
into State Mineral Lease No. 37794, which purported to lease 
* The 1983 Legislature amended §65-1-45 and, as 
amended, the "first applicant" procedure is set forth 
in subsection (1) of §65-1-45 and the competitive 
bidding procedures are set forth in subsection (2). 
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to Appellant the oil, gas and hydrocarbon rights to the 
property in question. (R. 5) However, subsequently the 
Division discovered that the property lying in Lots 3, 4, 5, 
6 and the South half of the Northwest quarter and the South 
half in Section 2 of Township 27 South, Range 20 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian, containing 509.18 acres, (herein-
after "the 509.18 acre tract") had previously been withdrawn 
from oil and gas leasing by the State Land Board (herein-
after, "the Board") and, hence, was unavailable for oil and 
gas leasing. (R. 63, 64) According to the Minutes of the 
Board's June 14, 1966, hearing, the Board withdrew this 
509.18 acre tract from oil and gas leasing because of its 
proximity to the potash lands of the Cane Creek Anticline 
which had been statutorily withdrawn from oil and gas 
leasing by the Utah Legislature in 1961, Section 65-1-99 
U.C.A (1953), as amended. (R. 64) All of the land discussed 
herein (both the land which was legislatively withdrawn and 
the land contained in the Plaintiff's lease which was 
withdrawn by the State Land Board) is now and has been at 
all relevant times hereto part of a producing potash unit. 
(R. 65, 66) 
Upon discovering that the lease which had been issued 
to Appellant included this withdrawn land, the Division, by 
letter dated March 25, 1981, notified him that his mineral 
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lease would have to be terminated as to the 509.18 acre 
tract, and that all of the rr.onies l•etid to the lllv1s1on by 
Appellant for rental of this tract would be refunded to him. 
(R. 67) Appellant appealed this action to the State Land 
Board but at the hearing on this matter on August 12, 1981, 
the Board rejected his claims and unanimously upheld the 
Division's action to delete the withdrawn portion of the 
property in question from his lease because the withdrawal 
had not been lifted and also because the lands were not 
posted for competitive bid, as required by Section 65-1-45 
and the State of Utah Rules and Regulations Governing the 
Issuance of Mineral Leases. (R. 68) 
Following this hearing the Division discovered that the 
remaining 80 acres contained in Appellant's lease, the North 
half of the southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 27 
South, Range 21 East, Salt Lake Base and r.ieridian, (herein-
after "the 80 acre tract"), had also been previously with-
drawn by the State Land Board from oil and gas leasing by 
a separate withdrawal order of the Board on June 8, 1967. 
(R. 69, 70) The Division then immediately notified Appellant 
by letter that because the remaining 80 acre tract had been 
previously withdrawn from oil and gas leasing, the lease 
would have to be cancelled. In this letter the Division 
also indicated it would refund the original filing fee and 
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all of the remaining rentals paid by him for this property. 
(R. 75) Appellant appealed the cancellation of this remain-
ing 80 acre tract to the State Land Board. At the Board's 
hearing on November 10, 1981, at the State Land Board 
hearing on this appeal, the Board unanimously upheld the 
cancellation of the Appellant's lease, again on the grounds 
that the property had been previously withdrawn from oil and 
gas leasing and also because the property had not been 
posted for competitive bid, as required by Section 65-1-45 
and the State of Utah Rules and Regulations Governing the 
Issuance of Mineral Leases. (R. 71) 
In order to explain more clearly the background of 
this case, the Division identified on a map of this area 
the portion of the land which was leased to Appellant, the 
portion of the land which was withdrawn from oil and gas 
leasing by the Board by its actions of June 14, 1966, and 
June 8, 1967, and the portion of the land which was 
statutorily withdrawn from oil and gas leasing by the Utah 
Legislature in 1961. (R. 72) None of the land which was 
leased to Appellant was that which was legislatively 
withdrawn from oil and gas leasing but the legislatively 
withdrawn land has been identified on the map to show its 
proximity to the land withdrawn by the State Land Board. 
For the Court's convenience, the same map that was included 
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in the record for the trial court (R. 72) has been attached 
hereto as Appendix "A." 
In January 1982 the Division refunded all of the 
monies paid by Appellant under his lease. On February 
13, 1982, Appellant sent the uncashed check back to the 
State Treasurer and notified the Division that an action 
would be initiated in the District Court to "test the 
cancellation of the Lease No. 37794." (R. 73) 
Thereafter, the Division notified Appellant by letter 
that the State refund check to him was being cancelled 
and that he would be credited with that amount for any 
other mineral lease held by him or, upon written request, 
returned to him in cash. (R. 74) 
In March 1982 Appellant sent a check for the 1982 
rental payment for the cancelled lease. The Division 
promptly returned his check and reaffirmed by letter that 
State Mineral Lease No. 37794 was cancelled. (R. 75) 
The trial court granted summary judgment on two 
grounds, first that Appellant had failed to comply with 
the statutory jurisdictional requirements of §65-1-9(2) 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, which provides that in order to 
appeal for judicial review of a decision of the State Land 
Board in a case such as this, a claimant must file a written 
protest with respect thereto with the Board within ninety 
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days after the final decision of the Board relating to such 
matter. In this case the Board issued its final decision 
with respect to the cancellation of the mineral lease as to 
the 509.18 acre tract on August 12, 1981. (R. 68) With 
respect to the cancellation of the rest of Appellant's lease 
after it was discovered the remaining 80 acres were also 
subject to a withdrawal order, the State Land Board issued 
its final decision on November 10, 1981. (R. 71) The only 
written protest filed by Appellant to either of these Board 
actions was his letter dated February 13, 1982. (R. 73) As 
the trial court noted in its Memorandum Decision, this 
letter was dated 185 days after the August 12, 1981, deci-
sion and 96 days after the November 10, 1981, decision. 
(R. 95, 96) 
The second ground on which summary judgment was 
granted against Appellant was that Appellant had failed to 
comply with the relevant and applicable requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-1 ~ ~., U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, (specifically, §§63-30-12, 15 and 19), 
which pertain to actions involving property and which must 
be satisfied for there to be a waiver of immunity. Appel-
lant concedes he made no attempt to comply with these 
jurisdictional requirements. (R. 102 and Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 3 and 4) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF §65-1-9(2) U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, 
AND IS, THEREFORE, BARRED FROM f!AINTAINING THIS ACTION. 
The trial court held that Appellant failed to comply 
with the jurisdictional requirements for judicial review as 
provided in §65-1-9(2) U.C.A. (1953), as amended. Section 
65-1-9 (2) provides: 
No claimant for lands under control of the board 
can appeal for judicial review of a decision of the 
board involving any sale. lease, or disposition of 
state lands. or any action relating thereto, unless 
such claimant files a written protest with respect 
thereto with the board within ninety days after the 
final decision of the board relating to such matter; 
or, with respect to decisions rendered prior to the 
effective date of this act, within ninety days after 
such effective date. This provision shall not relate 
to disputes between the board and any party as to the 
ownership or title to any lands. [Emphasis added.] 
The language of this statute could hardly be more 
clear. In order for Appellant to appeal for judicial 
review of the decisions of the State Land Board, he had to 
file a written protest with respect to the decisions within 
ninety days. In this case there were two final decisions of 
the State Land Board: one pertaining to the 509.18 acre 
tract and one pertaining to the 80 acre tract. The facts 
of this case show clearly that Appellant failed to file a 
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written protest timely with respect to either of these 
decisions. 
With regard to the 509.18 acre tract, upon discover-
ing the tract was subject to a withdrawal order and, 
therefore, not available for oil and gas leasing, the Divi-
sion of State Lands and Forestry, by letter dated March 
25, 1981, notified Appellant the 509.18 acre tract would 
have to be deleted from the mineral lease. Appellant 
requested State Land Board review of this Division action 
but at the hearing on this appeal on August 12, 1981, the 
Board unanimously decided the 509.18 acre tract should be 
deleted from the lease and Appellant's advance rental 
payment for that tract should be refunded to him. This 
Board action was the only Board action taken regarding the 
509.18 acre tract, and it was clearly a final decision of 
the Board. Pursuant to §65-1-9(2), Appellant had ninety 
days to file a written protest to this final decision; 
however, the facts demonstrate that the only communication 
from Appellant which could be construed as a written protest 
of the Board's decision was his February 13, 1982, letter, 
which came a full 185 days after the Board's August 12, 
1981, decision. 
\vith regard to the 80 acre tract, upon discovering 
that the 80 acre tract was also subject to a withdrawal 
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and, therefore, not available for oil and gas leasing, an 
employee of the Division of State Lands and Forestry, by 
letter dated August 12, 1981, not1f1ed Appellant of the 
error and of his intention to recommend to the Director 
that the remaining 80 acres of the lease be cancelled and 
all of the balance of the payments previously tendered by 
Appellant be refunded to him. On August 17, 1981, the 
Director cancelled the lease. Evidently this action was not 
communicated to Appellant because on October 29, 1981, he 
wrote to the Division asking if the Director had cancelled 
the 80 acre tract. Also in that letter, Appellant 
requested, pursuant to Section 65-1-9, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, and the Rules and Regulations of the Division of 
State Lands, a "hearing before the land board regarding the 
purported deletion of the 80 acres from my lease." (R. 25) 
This letter made no mention of the Board's action regarding 
the 509.18 acre tract. At the Board's November 10, 1981, 
hearing, the Board unanimously upheld the cancellation of 
Appellant's lease. As with the 509.18 acre tract, the only 
written communication which could be construed as a written 
protest to this final decision of the Board was Appellant's 
February 13, 1982, letter, which, even if it were to be 
assumed that the letter was "filed" with the Board on the 
same day it was written, came 96 days after the November 10, 
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1981, final decision of the State Land Board. 
Notwithstanding the plain meaning of §65-1-9(2), 
Appellant argues §65-1-9(2) should be read in conjunction 
with §§65-1-1 and 2.1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, to the 
conclusion that in this case the State Land Board should 
never have even been involved to review the Division's 
action. 
Appellant's argument goes something like this: as 
originally organized the State Land Board was the only state 
agency involved in state lands management, and it handled 
the day-to-day management as well as the policy-making 
responsibilities with respect thereto. Then in 1967 when 
the §§65-1-1 and 2.1 were enacted, the Legislature created a 
division of state lands to handle the day-to-day operations 
and the board of state lands to be responsible for all 
policy-making functions, powers, duties, rights and respon-
sibilities. Rather than legislatively decide which pro-
visions of Title 65 involve policy-making functions and 
which do not, the Legislature stated in §65-1-1: 
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this act, 
whenever reference is made in Title 65, or in any other 
provision of law, to the state land board it shall be 
construed as referring to the board of state lands 
where such reference pertains to policy-making 
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functions, powers, duties, rishts and res['ons1L,il ities; 
but in all other instances such reference shall be 
construed as referring tot he division of state lands. 
Thus, the Legislature left it to the Board of State 
Lands to decide what functions involve policy-making and 
what do not. 
Appellant's argument continues, because §65-1-9(2) 
consistently refers to "the board," and a decision of "the 
board," in light of §§65-1-1 and 2.1 every time the words 
"the board" appear the words "the division" must be 
substituted instead, to the conclusion there really is no 
appeal of a Division action to the Board, the Board is a 
non-entity so far as review of Division action is concerned, 
and it is only the Division that acts and then reviews 
itself. Thus, Appellant's protest of the Divition action 
to cancel his lease interests is the only protest that is 
required by §65-1-9(2). Respondent submits this interpre-
tation of these statutory provisions is not only strained 
and irrational, it is unsupported by law, unworkeable on a 
day-to-day basis, and contrary to Appellant's own view of 
the relative roles as evicenced by his actions in this 
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case.* 
First, Appellant's argument requires this Court to 
ignore the very plain language of §65-1-9(2) that it is the 
Board that is to make final decisions for lands under its 
control and timely written protest must be given thereto 
before a claimant can appeal for judicial review. 
Second, assuming Appellant is contending that it is the 
Division that takes and action such as the one in this case 
and it is the Division Director who reviews that action, 
* Appellant states on pp. 7 and 8 of his brief that 
§§65-1-1 and 2.1 provide that it is the Executive 
Director of the Department of Natural Resources who 
actually makes final decisions with respect to matters 
other than those determining policy for the Division of 
State Lands. Although Respondent is somewhat unclear 
as to whether Appellant is really suggesting the 
Executive Director of the Department of Natural 
Resources has the role of reviewing day-to-day land 
management decisions, such interpretation is wholly 
unsupported by the enabling legislation pertaining to 
the Executive Director of the Department of Natural 
Resources. §63-34-1 tl fil2·, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, which provides for the Department of Natural 
Resources which coordinates ten different state boards 
and seven different state agencies; and these statutes 
make abundantly clear the Executive Director's essen-
tial role is "the administration and supervision of the 
department of natural resouces" to effect "coordination 
and co-operation among the boards and divisions of 
it •... " Section 63-34-5 U.C.A. (1983 Interim Supple-
ment, Part 2, pp. 888 and 889). Although the statute 
requires the Executive Director to do "such other 
duties as the Legislature shall assign to him," it is 
preposterous to suggest the Executive Director has been 
legislatively assigned the specific additional duty to 
review all of the hundreds of lease actions the 
Division may take throughout any given year. 
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such a contention ignores the statutory scheme of Title 65, 
which makes the Division and che Di1ector <Jne r,nd the same. 
Pursuant to §65-1-3.l, the Director of r.he Division is the 
executive and administrative head of the Division. More-
over, what Appellant is asserting is that a Division staff 
employee could make an official Division decision which 
could be protested and appealed to the Division Director. 
Title 65 does not provide for such an intra-agency review 
process. Thus, what Appellant is asserting is that it is 
the Division Director who would make a final decision on a 
Division cancellation of a state oil and gas lease, and this 
is nothing more than to say there is no administrative 
review at all of such an action. 
Third, if the plain language of §65-1-9(2) were to 
be ignored, and the Court were to consider whether the 
cancellation involves a policy-making function such that 
it was appropriate for the Board to review the Division 
cancellation of Appellant's lease pursuant to §65-1-9(2), 
it seems reasonable to assume that virtually every action 
by the Division to cancel a lease necessarily involves 
some policy-making function, power, duty, right or 
responsibility. Certainly that is how the Board has 
interpreted its responsibilities because it is the Board 
and not the Division that reviews such matters in every 
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case. 
Fourth, because the Board has itself determined the 
hearing of all appeals of Division lease actions to be a 
legitimate exercise of its responsibilities, as this Court 
held in Colman y. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 
19, 403 P.2d 781, 784 (1965), this determination must be 
treated as prima facie correct and not regarded otherwise 
so long as the function conforms with the general objections 
the agency is charged to carry out and there is a rational 
basis for it in the provisions of the law. 
Fifth, even if it were somehow to be concluded that 
Board review of Division lease actions was not in every 
case appealable to the Board, but for only those matters 
which involve a policy consideration, certainly under the 
facts of this case review of the cancellation of Appellant's 
lease involves a policy consideration. In this matter the 
Board had previously withdrawn two tracts from oil and gas 
leasing and there could hardly be a clearer example of a 
land management policy decision than a decision to withdraw 
lands from leasing. It only stands to reason that con-
sideration of whether a lease for those withdrawn should 
be permitted in direct contradiction to those withdrawals 
is, therefore, also a policy decision. 
Sixth, Appellant's argument that the Director's actions 
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terminating the lease should be the "final decisions" as 
contemplated in §65-1-9(2) is unworkable on a day to day 
level. Instead of having an orderly process of Division 
action and Board review of that action, a claimant for lands 
administered by the Division and the Board would have to 
guess to whom he should request review and hope he guesses 
correctly. 
Finally, the Appellant's argument is utterly incon-
sistent with his own view of the relative roles of the 
Division and the Board, as evidenced by his own actions in 
this case. In both instances when the Division notified him 
of its intent to terminate the respective tracts of land 
Appellant requested review by the Board of that Division 
action. Indeed, Mr. Adkins' letter dated October 29, 1981, 
pertaining to the deletion of the 80 acre tract states: 
"[p]ursuant to Section 65-1-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, and the Rules and Regulations of the Division of 
State Lands, I hereby request a hearing before the land 
board regarding the purported deletion of the 80 acres from 
my lease." (R. 25) 
As a final note, the Appellant complains that the 
plain reading of §65-1-9(2) requires a claimant upset with 
a Division action to request a hearing before the Board, 
obtain a ruling from the Board and then, if still unhappy 
-18-
with the Board ruling, file a timely written protest with 
the Board in order to appeal for judicial review. He says 
this does not make sense because this procedure would only 
accomplish "a second appeal to the Board of State Lands or 
to the Director of Natural Resources." However, this is 
simply a mistatement of the ordinary process for review and 
of what happened in this case. The procedure that was 
followed in this case was (1) an action by the Division, (2) 
a request by the claimant for Board review of that action, 
(3) Board review of that action. Where the process broke 
down for the Appellant was his failure to comply with §65-1-
9 (2), as he was obliged to do. It is not for ll.ppellant to 
second guess the wisdom of §65-1-9(2) but it certainly is 
his obligation to comply with it. And in view of the fact 
the plain wording of that provision requires a claimant to 
comply and in this case he simply did not, he has waived his 
right to obtain judicial review of his claims. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, 
SECTION §63-30-1 LT .s.E.Q., (1953), AS AMENDED. 
The trial court held also that Appellant failed to 
comply with the relevant and applicable requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 63-30-1 ~ ~., U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended, which pertain to actions involving 
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property and which must be satisfied for there to be a 
waiver of governmental immunity. 
At the outset of Point II it is important to state 
what Respondent is nQt. contending. Respondent is not 
contending that this is the sort of action for the State 
is immune from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
To the contrary, Respondent has consistently asserted that 
this is an action involving property, for which, pursuant 
to §63-30-6 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, immunity has been 
waived so long as the other requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act have been met. With this in mind, Respondent 
submits the trial court correctly held that Appellant failed 
to comply with relevant and applicable requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act, and, therefore, cannot now 
maintain this action. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act is an act which 
provides exceptions, limitations and conditions on the im-
munity which is generally accorded to governmental entities, 
including the Respondent in this action. Section 63-3-3 
U.C.A (1981 Supp.) provides: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
act, all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health care 
facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or 
other professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
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facilities. 
The Act specifically waives certain kinds of actions 
from immunity, including actions such as the one before the 
Court involving property, Section 63-30-6 U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. Section 63-30-6 provides: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities 
is waived for the recovery of any property real or 
personal or for the possession thereof or to quiet 
title thereto, or to foreclose mortgages or other liens 
thereon or to determine any adverse claim thereon, or 
secure any adjudication touching any mortgage or other 
lien said entity may have or claim on the property 
involved. 
For those actions in which immunity has been waived 
(except actions involving contractual obligations) the Act 
provides several requirements to be met by claimants in 
order for them to be able to bring actions against govern-
mental entities. The requirements of the Act which are 
relevant to the case at bench include Section 63-30-12 
U.C.A. (1981 Supp.) which requires a notice of claim to be 
filed with the Attorney General and the Agency concerned 
within one year after the cause of action arises. Section 
63-30-12 provides: 
A claim against the state is barred unless notice 
of claim is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the cause of 
action arises. 
Section 63-30-15 provides that a suit against the State may 
be filed only if and after such claim is denied. In this 
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case Appellant did not file a notice of claim with either 
the Attorney General or the Division of State Lands and 
Forestry. 
Appellant also failed to file an undertaking pursuant 
to Section 63-30-19 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, which pro-
vides as follows: 
At the time of filing the action the plaintiff 
shall file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, 
but in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned 
upon payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs incurred 
by the governmental entity in the action if the 
plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails to 
recover judgment. 
Although Section 63-30-6 waives immunity as to actions 
involving property, there is no question Appellant must 
comply with the notice and undertaking requirements of Sec-
tions 63-30-12 and 19 in order to bring an action against 
a State agency. Ash v. State, Utah, 572 P.2d 1374 (1977). 
Accord, Walton y. State Road Commission, Utah, 558 P.2d 
609, 611 (1976), in which this Court held 
••. this case is determinable on the sole ground of 
failure to file a claim required by Title 63-30-12, 
U.C.A. 1953, which bars a claim under the Government 
Immunity Act unless written notice is filed with the 
Utah Attorney General and the agency concerned within 
one year after the cause of action arises. 
In the instant case Appellant's cause of action is barred 
because he did not comply with these jurisdictional notice 
requirements and the undertaking requirements. 
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On appeal Appellant argues that Standiford v, Salt 
Lake City Corporation, Utah, 605 P.2d 1236 (1980), Johnson 
v. Salt Lake City Corporation, Utah, 629 P.2d 432 (1981), 
and Thomas y, Clearfield City, Utah, 642 P.2d 737 (1982), 
support his contention that the facts of this case Respon-
dent cannot claim immunity from suit. But these cases 
simply do not apply because Respondent bas not asserted that 
the State is immune from suit because the action involves 
the exercise of a governmental function. To the contrary, 
§63-30-6 clearly waives immunity; but despite this waiver of 
immunity, based on the Act itself and the cases cited above, 
Appellant was still obliged to comply with the legislatively 
mandated notice, claim and undertaking requirements. In 
view of the fact Appellant failed to so comply, he is barred 
from maintaining this action. 
Appellant's final argument pertaining to the Govern-
mental Immunity Act is that this case really involves an 
action arising out of a contractual obligation as provided 
in §63-30-5 and is, therefore, not conditioned upon com-
pliance with the notice, claim and undertaking requirements 
of the Act. The trial court in its Memorandum Decision 
rejected this contention on the ground "such interpreta-
tion of the state-granted leases does not comport with 
the general intent and history of the dealings of the 
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parties." Although, as Appellant asserts, it is generally 
held that a lease is more of a contract than a conveyance of 
an estate, the general rule is JUSt the opposite when it 
involves a mineral or oil and gas lease. See, generally, 38 
AmJur.2d Gas and Oil §69 (1968). Because of this property 
interest, an oil and gas lease is distinguished from a lease 
that creates an ordinary landlord-tenant relationship. 
E.g., Vanzandt v. Heilman, 54 N.M. 97, 214 P.2d 864 
(1950). Thus, cases such as t1edical-Dental Building Co. 
of Los Anaeles y. Horton and Converse, 21 Cal.2d 411, 132 
P.2d 457 (1942), which was cited by Appellant, have no 
application to mineral leases. 
POINT III 
THE STATE OIL AND GAS LEASE ISSUED TO APPELLANT WAS 
PROPERLY TERMINATED BECAUSE THE LANDS IN THE LEASE 
HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM OIL AND GAS LEASING BY ORDER 
OF THE STATE LAND BOARD AND WERE, THEREFORE, UNAVAIL-
ABLE TO BE LEASED TO ANYONE. 
Because the trial court decided Appellant did not 
comply with the jurisdictional requirements of §65-1-9(2) 
and §63-30-1 ~ ~., the court did not reach his other 
claims regarding the termination of the lease. And, 
assuming this Court affirms the trial court on the 
jurisdictional issues, obviously these claims do not 
need to be reviewed on appeal. However, in the event this 
Court reverses the trial court on the jurisdictional issues, 
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Respondent submits Appellant is still not entitled to the 
oil and gas lease because the oil and gas interest was 
withdrawn from leasing by the State Land Board and was, 
therefore, unavailable to be leased to anyone. 
As mentioned in the Introduction to this brief, this 
lawsuit resulted because a state oil, gas and hydrocarbon 
lease was issued when it should not have been. In the 
event the Court reaches the merits of Appellant's claims, 
it is critical to keep in mind what Appellant is really 
asking is that due to inadvertence or oversight on the part 
of the state agency, a mineral lease 1!l.!..W.t. be issued to a 
private individual when the policy-making board charged with 
the management of that publicly-owned land had previously 
determined the public interest would be best served by 
withdrawing the subject land from that kind of mineral 
entry. Such a result would be disastrous to Respondent in 
this case which is charged with the responsibility of 
managing 3.6 million acres of land within this state. To 
hold this agency to a standard of perfection in its admin-
istrative functions regarding mineral leases would gravely 
impair its ability to perform its management responsibil-
ities. 
In Point III of his brief, Appellant contends he should 
be entitled to lease the 509.18 acre tract of land on the 
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theory that as of June 14, 1966, when the State Land Board 
withdrew that tract from oil and gas leasin~, the Board 
lacked the authority to withdraw lands from any type of 
mineral leasing. This contention is simply without merit. 
Although it is true that as of June 1966 there was no 
statutory provision expressly authorizing the Board to 
make such withdrawals, the Board certainly had discretion to 
withdraw land from certain kinds of mineral entry if it 
determined that development of the two separate mineral 
interests would conflict with one another. This power is 
necessarily implicit in the Board's statutory land manage-
ment responsibilities, and the Board's authority to order 
withdrawals as this Court expressly acknowledged in ~ 
in Archer v. State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 322, 392 
P.2d 622, 623 (1964). 
In addition, Section 65-1-95 U.C.A., as it provided at 
the time the Board made this withdrawal (it has since been 
repealed), authorized the Board to "make and enforce rules 
and regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
act for carrying the same into effect." Although the Board 
did not have a specific rule or regulation describing its 
withdrawal capability, even apart from the fact the Board 
ordered these withdrawals, it is evident the Board has 
consistently interpreted its discretion as including such 
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authority because Rule 12(d) of its Rules and Regulations 
Governing the Issuance of Mineral Leases (revised to include 
a~endments to October 13, 1966) referred to "minerals on 
State lands which have been withdrawn from mineral 
leasing" [emphasis added]. (R. 76, 77) 
Finally, as this Court held in Whitmore y. Candland, 
47 Utah 77, 88, 181 P. 528, 532 (1915), "[t]he whole matter 
of making disposition of the State's land was placed in the 
hands and under the control of the State Land Board." And 
in the matter of making disposition of state lands, the 
Board has discretion in making management decisions, G.L.fill1. 
v. State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971). 
In ordering the 1966 withdrawal, it is obvious from the 
Board's action of ordering the withdrawal of the 509.18 acre 
tract from oil and gas leasing that the Board viewed 
withdrawal as a legitimate exercise of its discretionary 
management responsiblities. Although Archer y, State Land 
~, supra, clearly recognizes the authority of the Board 
to withdraw lands from mineral leases under appropriate 
circumstances, should there be any question remaining that 
this authority was necessarily implicit in the Board's land 
ffianagement capabilities, the fact the Board itself con-
sidered this to be a legitimate exercise of its responsi-
bilities must be treated as prima facie correct and not 
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regarded otherwise so long as the function conforms with the 
general objectives it is charged to carry out and there is a 
rational basis for it in the provisions of the law, Colman 
y. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 19, 403 P.2d 781, 
784 (1965), wherein the Court held: 
Where such uncertainty exists the interpretation 
and application of statutes adopted by the adminis-
trative agency is usually looked upon with some indul-
gence. It is both just and practical that the Board 
should be allowed considerable latitute of discretion 
in deciding what policies will best carry out the 
responsibilities imposed upon it. Due to the consider-
rations just stated, and because of its experience and 
presumed expert knowledge in its field, an adminis-
trative interpretation and application of a statute ... 
is generally regarded as prima facie correct and not to 
be overturned so long as it is in conformity with the 
general objectives the agency is charged with carrying 
out, and there is a rational basis for it in the 
provisions of the law. 
Finally, in Grant y. State Land Board, supra, 
26 Utah 2d at 103, 485 P.2d at 1037, this Court considered 
the nature of the State Land Board's land management respon-
sibilities, holding that "[t]he general purpose of the law 
in giving the Land Board responsibility for administering 
the public lands is to encourage their settlement and 
development so that they and their resources can be widely 
used, managed and conserved." There can be no question 
the Board's withdrawal of the 509.18 acre tract was con-
sistent with proper land management objectives because it 
added additional protection to the potash development in the 
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Cane Creek area which the Legislature had previously sought 
to protect and promote, and, therefore, the 1966 decision to 
withdraw the 509.18 tract was a permissible and desirable 
exercise of land management discretion. 
Appellant cites Hirsh y. Ogden Furniture and Carpet 
.{;Q., 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 (1918), in support of his 
argument that the Board's withdrawal of the 509.18 tract was 
invalid in absence of an express statutory grant of power to 
withdraw lands from leasing prior to 1967 when the Legis-
lature amended §65-1-45 to provide the specific authority to 
withdraw state lands from leasing. In H..iLfill the Court 
considered whether a notice of filing a remittitur had to be 
given a party under a statute that was silent as to notice 
but which was subsequently amended to require notice. The 
Court held there was nothing in the statute requiring 
such notice and the subsequent amendment indicated the 
legislative intent that such notice was not required prior 
to the amendment. .lii.r...s.h is relied on by Appellant for 
the general rule that an addition in a statute shoula be 
regarded as a departure from the previous law. 
~ does not aFply to the instant case for at 
least two reasons: first, unlike H...i.Lfill, this case con-
cerns whether in the absence of an express statutory author-
ization, an authority to take a certain kind of action could 
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be implied from the broad statutory grant of authority 
providing for policy discretion. .lii..I..l2.h concerned an 
analysis of whether a precedural requirement should be 
implied when apparently there was no statute from which a 
requirement could be implied. In this case the Board was 
charged with broad land management discretion by statute, 
and the Board construed withdrawal as a reasonable, rational 
and, in this case, necessary exercise of the existing 
statutory grant of land management discretion to promote 
potash development. Under Colman y. Utah State Land 
.B.Q<u.Q, supra, that interpretation must be treated as ~ 
~ correct. Second, and perhaps even more important, 
unlike in .li.iJ:..s.h, in this case the Utah Supreme Court has 
already acknowledged in dicta the Board's power to 
withdraw land from leasing for good cause shown as a 
reasonable exercise of that discretion. Archer y. State 
Land Board, supra. Obviously, in~ there was no such 
judicial recognition of the existence of a notice require-
ment. 
Therefore, unlike in ~. no reason exists in this 
case to support the view that the Legislature, by amending 
§65-1-45 in 1967 expressly to include the power to withdraw 
land from certain kinds of mineral entry, meant to change 
the law to provide for a new tool for responsible land 
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management. To the contrary, based on the broad statutory 
grant of discretion in Title 65 and the case law discussed 
herein, there can be no question that by amending §65-1-45 
in 1967 the Legislature intended only to codify and clarify 
the already existing authority to withdraw lands under 
appropriate circumstances. 
POINT IV 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THE 509.18 ACRE TRACT WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR LEASING BECAUSE THE WITHDRAWAL WAS 
INVALID, APPELLANT IS STILL NOT ENTITLED TO LEASE THE 
509.18 ACRE TRACT BECAUSE THE LEASE WAS NOT ACQUIRED 
THROUGH THE COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY 
§65-1-45 U.C.A. (1953) 1 AS AMENDED. 
Appellant contends that with respect to the 509.18 acre 
tract which had been withdrawn from oil and gas leasing by 
order of the State Land Board in 1966 (R. 64), he should be 
entitled to lease the tract because (a) the 1966 withdrawal 
was void because the Board did not have the authority to 
order the withdrawal (as discussed in Point III) _gn_Q (b) 
under §65-1-45 U.C.A. as that statute provided in 1966, he 
was entitled to lease the interest because he was the first 
applicant for the interest. It should be noted in order for 
Appellant to prevail on the claim this Court would have to 
hold that the 1966 withdrawal was unlawful and void .fill.d 
that Appellant could lease the land merely by making appli-
cation and thereby avoid the competitive leasing requirement 
of §65-1-45. Point III addresses the withdrawal issue; this 
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Point IV addresses Appellant's contention he is entitled to 
lease the 509.18 acre tract under the "first applicant" 
procedure of §65-1-45. 
At the outset it should also be noted that Appellant's 
argument in Points III and IV pertain only to the 509.18 
acre tract. Appellant has conceded that as to the 80 acre 
tract the Board's 1967 withdrawal was proper. (R. 137-139, 
141) 
With respect to the 509.18 acre tract, the State Land 
Board, at its August 12, 1981, hearing to review the 
Division's action to delete this tract from Appellant's oil 
and gas lease, ruled the Division had acted properly to 
delete the tract from the lease on the .t'n'Q grounds that 
the tract was subject to the withdrawal .fill.d because the 
lands had not "been posted for simultaneous filing." (R. 68) 
The Board's reference to "simultaneous filing" relates to 
one of the only two ways one can obtain a state mineral 
lease: as a "first applicant" or as a result of being the 
highest bidder pursuant to the competitive leasing pro-
cedure, as provided in §65-1-45. 
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute what law ap-
plies to this question. Appellant argues that §65-1-45 as 
it provided in 1966 aFplies. This provision stated as 
follows: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, applications 
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to lease shall be considered in the order filed; pro-
vided, that when simultaneous applications are filed 
the land board shall let the land to the applicant who 
will pay the highest rental therefor; and provided 
further, that applications to lease land already under 
lease, shall not be received before the day following 
the expiration of said lease, and all such applications 
received on such day shall be considered simultaneous. 
In all cases where lands become available for 
leasing by the state because they are newly acquired or 
because a previous mineral lease is cancelled or other-
wise terminated by the board, such land shall be offer-
ed for mineral lease by the following procedure .••• 
[Competitive bidding procedures set forth.] 
Respondent asserts, however, the law that controls 
is the law as it read when Appellant filed his application 
to lease this land. The law as it read in March 1980 when 
Appellant made his application provided as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided herein applications 
to lease state lands for mineral purposes shall be 
considered in the order in which they are filed. The 
division of state lands shall have the authority to 
withdraw state lands from leasing, but unless state 
lands are withdrawn and except as otherwise provided 
herein, the division shall lease the land to the first 
qualified applicant who has filed an application in 
accordance with rules and regulations promulgated by 
the board of state lands. 
In all cases where lands become available for 
leasing by the division because they are newly 
acquired, or because an existing mineral lease is 
canceled, relinquished, surrendered, or for any reason 
terminates, except where the division determines it is 
not in the best interest of the state to offer the land 
for lease, the division shall offer the land for 
subsequent mineral leasing by the following procedure 
only ..• , [Competitive bidding procedures set forth.] * 
Since 1980 ~65-1-~5 has been amended twice: once in 
1981, see U.C.A. Second Replacement Volume 7A 1981 
Pocket Supplement; and once in 1983, see U.C.A. 1983 
Interim Supplement, Part 2, pp. 960, 961. 
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However, even assuming, arguendo, the older version 
of §65-1-45 applies, Appellant is still not entitled to 
lease the land as a first applicant. Under the older 
version of §65-1-45, the Appellant could not lease the land 
as a first applicant because the land had become available 
for leasing "because a previous mineral lease [had been] 
cancelled or otherwise terminated by the board." In this 
matter, there was a previous mineral lease on the 509.18 
acre tract that had been cancelled by the Board on February 
14, 1966, for nonpayment of rental. The only evidence in 
the record regarding this previous lease appears in the 
Minutes of the State Land Board's June 14, 1966, hearing in 
which the Board withdrew the 509.18 acre tract from oil and 
gas leasing. (R. 63, 64) The t-iinutes, in pertinent part, 
state: 
Oil and gas lease t\L 6790, MLA 5436, was issued on 
March 18, 1955, on All Sec. 2, T. 27 S., R. 20 E., SLM, 
containing 698.64 acres. This land is on the southwest 
flank of the Cane Creek Anticline. 
ML 6790 was cancelled on February 14, 1966, for 
nonpayment of rental for the portion of its term from 
January 1, 1966 [sic] until April 1, 1966. 
Obviously, assuming the oil and gas interest was even 
available for leasing, in view of the fact the previous 
mineral lease was cancelled by the Board, under either 
version of §65-1-45 the only way the oil and gas could be 
leased was through the simultaneous bidding procedures. 
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Nevertheless, without any evidentiary support, 
whatsoever, Appellant claims the Minutes of the Board 
hearing, which are a public record, are simply wrong. 
Appellant's arguments are nothing more than speculation 
and mere conjecture. In view of the fact there is no 
evidence contrary to the Minutes of the June 14, 1966, 
Board hearing as to the reason for the cancellation of the 
previous mineral lease, this evidence must be regarded as 
correct. See Wendling v. Cundall, Utah, 568 P.2d 888 
(1977). 
Appellant argues that the date of the cancellation 
of the previous mineral lease does not square with the date 
the primary term of the mineral lease would have ended. But 
Respondent submits that this does not by itself raise any 
fact sufficient to raise a question as to the accuracy of 
the Minutes of the Board's hearing. 
POINT V 
RESPONDENT CANNOT EE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
THE LEASE TO APPELLANT IS INVALID. 
Appellant claims that Respondent should be estopped 
from asserting the lease to him was invalid, and he assigns 
two reasons for that position: first, he claims the 
Division did not notify him that the Board upheld the 
Division's recommendation of cancellation on the ground the 
simultaneous leasing procedures were not followed as well as 
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because of the prior withdrawals. Second, he suggests the 
Division should be estopped because it "n:isled" him "into 
believing that certain lands were avail2ble for leasing 
[and] that he was qualified to lease theD." (Appellant's 
brief, p. 17.) 
The Utah Supreme Court held in First Equity Car-
poration of Florida v. Utah State University, Utah, 544 
P.2d 887 (1975), that estoppel cannot be asserted against a 
governmental entity when that entity has acted in excess of 
its statutory power, such as the Division did in this case 
when it mistakenly issued the lease to Appellant when the 
lands were unavailable for leasing. Accord, Utah State 
University y. Sutro and Co., Utah, 646 P.2d 715, 718 
(1982), wherein the Court stated: 
We have no doubt about the soundness of the rule 
that estoppel generally is not assertable against the 
government or governmental institutions. There are 
good and sufficient reasons for that rule, including 
the safeguarding the interests of the public. 
In this case Appellant would have this Court estop 
Respondent from trying to undo the mistake it made in 
issuing the mineral lease despite the existence of the 
withdrawals on the subject land. And not only that, Ap-
pellant wants this Court to estop Respondent from alleging 
that even if the land had been available for leasing, 
because the land had been subJect to a previous mineral 
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lease that had been cancelled, §65-1-45 requires that the 
Division could only lease the land under the simultaneous 
filing procedures. Estoppel is not appropriate in this case 
because cancellation of Appellant's lease for these reasons 
is necessary to safeguard the interests of the public. The 
withdrawals from oil and gas leasing by the Board were to 
safeguard what it had determined to be the public interest 
in fostering the potash development of those lands, and the 
Division cannot, either intentionally or by mistake, undo 
that revocation or otherwise act in such a way to nullify 
that Board action. And with respect to §65-1-45, the 
statute clearly requires when a previous lease is cancelled, 
as the undisputed evidence in this case shows, the Division 
must lease the land only by the competitive bidding 
procedure. This Court construed the legislative intent 
embodied in the competitive bidding procedure of §65-1-45 in 
Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 17 Utah 2d 14, 403 P.2d 
781 (1965), in which the Court held that this procedure 
safeguards the interest of the public: 
The statutes we have referred to should be 
considered together and in connection with the entire 
act and harmonized insofar as possible with the 
carrying out of the responsibilities the Land Board is 
charged with of managing the public lands of the State 
in the most prudent and profitable manner possible. 
Viewed in conformity with that objective, it appears to 
be intended that when mineral leasing rights are "first 
available for leasing" they should be put on the open 
market and an opportunity for competitive bidding be 
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given. This safeguards the interests of the State by 
getting the best price a qualified bidder will pay, and 
also protects the interest of all persons who might be 
interested by allowing them a fair opportunity to bid. 
17 Utah 2d at 18. 
An exception to the general rule that estoppel 
generally is not assertable against a governmental entity 
arises if a party can show that manifest injustice would 
result if estoppel could not be asserted against the 
governmental entity, Utah State University y. Sutro and 
.l:Q., Celebrity Club. Inc. y. Utah Liguor Control, Utah, 
602 P.2d 689 (1979), but the facts of this case do not 
warrant invoking this exception. All of the monies paid by 
Appellant have either been refunded to him, offered to be 
refunded to him, or offered to be credited to any other 
account Appellant has with the Division. Further, Appel-
lant had not begun drilling operations under the lease nor 
had he even explored for oil and gas before the Division 
terminated the lease. (R. 68) Appellant complains he was 
somehow disadvantaged because the Division, in informing him 
of the Board's final decision, did not list the fact that 
the land had not been put up for competitive bid as one of 
the reasons the Board upheld the Division's cancellation. 
But this contention overlooks the fact the record clearly 
shows that the competitive bidding issue was one of the two 
grounds on which the Board based its decision in both Board 
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hearings pertaining to Appellant's lease (R. 68, 71), 
Appellant had requested both of these hearings, and the 
Minutes of these hearings show this issue as a factor in the 
Board's decision. Appellant has failed to demonstrate that 
estoppel is appropriate in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly ruled Appellant failed to 
comply with the requirements for judicial review, §65-1-9(2) 
U.C.A. (1953), as amended, under the clear and undisputed 
facts of this case, and with the requirements for waiver of 
governmental immunity, §63-30-1 tl ~·, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended. Notwithstanding Appellant's erroneous, cumbersome 
and impractical construction of the relevant and applicable 
statutes, the plain fact is Appellant simply failed to do 
what these statutes require him to do to maintain this 
action. 
Because Appellant did not satisfy the applicable 
jurisdictional requirements, the trial court did not reach 
the other claims raised by Appellant. Obviously, assuming 
this Court affirms the trial court, these claims do not need 
to be reviewed on appeal. However, even if these claims are 
reviewed, the land involved in this lawsuit is subject to 
two previous withdrawals which are valid and binding, and 
the land simply is not available to be leased to anyone, not 
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even the Appellant. If this land ever becomes available for 
leasing by the Division, it will only do so at :c.ucli time as 
those withdrawals are revoked and the land is ~ut up for 
competitive bid. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Order Granting 
Summary Judgment entered by the trial court herein should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ANNE M. STIRBA 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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